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present danger" standard should not only control jury verdicts in 
free speech cases but also limit legislative discretion.w Holmes re-
fused to travel that road, informed Brandeis that he had gone "too 
far," and joined Justice McKenna's opinion upholding Gilbert's 
conviction under the Minnesota criminal anarchy statute.11 When 
the Warren Court finally drove a constitutional stake through the 
heart of these remaining sedition laws in the late 1960s, it did so by 
invoking the Holmes of Abrams and the Brandeis of Gilbert. 
In a case as rich with social and intellectual significance as this 
one, there were bound to be a few striking ironies. Polenberg cap-
tures these, too. Supporters of the defendants, many of them anar-
chists and socialists, cashed in Liberty Bonds to raise their bail. 
Punished for defending the Bolshevik Revolution in America, they 
were later banished from the Soviet Union for counterrevolutionary 
activities. Vicious though they sometimes were, even Henry Clay-
ton and J. Edgar Hoover showed a greater respect for civil liberties 
than Felix Dzerzhinsky and the Cheka. 
THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE 
AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC. By Ralph 
Lerner.! Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1987. Pp. 
XV, 238. $24.95. 
Robert Scigliano 2 
In this collection of seven essays, Professor Ralph Lerner 
shows himself to be a discerning student of early American political 
thought and practice. Rich and subtle in understanding and grace-
ful in expression, these essays must be read with care if their merits 
are to be fully appreciated. All of them will receive some notice 
here, but most of my attention will be given to "The Supreme Court 
as Republican Schoolmaster," both because its subject is closest to 
the concerns of this journal and because it raises the most questions 
in my mind. 
Professor Lerner begins with an effort at "Recovering the 
Revolution" from "modern historians," among whom J.G.A. 
Pocock, Bernard Bailyn, and, above all, Gordon S. Wood figure 
10. 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
II. /d. at 334 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
I. Professor of Social Thought, University of Chicago. 
2. Professor of Political Science, Boston College. 
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prominently in his account.3 Such historians either suppose "that 
all thinking takes place within horizons beyond our ken and power" 
or "that the meanings of important concepts were hardly clear to 
the very people voicing them." At bottom, they do not believe that 
serious thought matters but treat it as "ideology," as shaped by so-
cial, psychological, or economic forces. As a result, they often deni-
grate or misconstrue the thought of the past. 
The correctness of Lerner's depiction of modern historians has 
been largely confirmed by none other than Gordon Wood himself, 
in a recent essay in The New York Review of Books.4 Wood does 
this partly by concession, in acknowledging that "Lerner is not en-
tirely wrong when he suggests that the ideas the ideological histori-
ans [Wood specifies only Bailyn] write about often 'remain 
strangely evanescent .... ' " But mainly he confirms Lerner's de-
piction by standing his ground. "The secret to America's political 
success," he asserts, "cannot be found in any piece of paper or even 
in the thoughts and deeds of the men who framed the Constitution 
two hundred years ago. Rather the secret lies in our society and 
culture, which have been shaped by our entire historical experi-
ence." Although he does not acknowledge that modern historians 
have misconstrued past thought, Wood observes that "an act of im-
agination is required to recover it in all its fullness." I suppose that 
Lerner, a student of philosophy, might reply that imagination is the 
realm of poetry and that poets, as Socrates said, do not stick to the 
truth. 
As a case study in historical misconstruction, Lerner considers 
Wood's portrayal of John Adams, in The Creation of the American 
Republic, "as one who moved from hopeful enthusiasm to a redou-
bled anxiety and loss of republican faith." To the contrary, argues 
Lerner, the young Adams always kept his judgment in balance and 
the old Adams "was still the very model of a thinking revolution-
ary." Lerner's illustration, it seems to me, is inconclusive, for 
Wood could have invoked the authority of Jefferson and Hamilton, 
by citing the former's opinion that Adams "had originally been a 
republican" but had, about the mid-1780s, undergone "apostasy to 
hereditary monarchy and aristocracy" and the latter's opinion that 
Adams was "a man of an imagination sublimated [in the sense of 
3. Cf B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); G. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). 
4. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, N.Y. REV. OF BooKS, Feb. 18, 
1988, at 33. See also id. at 38, 40. 
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"vaporous" or "heated"] and eccentric. "s A better case against 
Wood was made by Gary L. Schmitt and Robert Web king in an 
article published several years ago. Examining the same sources 
that Wood did, and sometimes the very words he took from them, 
Schmitt and Web king showed that Wood had transformed the lib-
erty-loving Americans of the founding era into equality-loving com-
munitarians and had transformed the framers into devotees of 
aristocratic govemment.6 That indeed was an act of imagination, a 
re-creation of the American republic. 
Lerner makes his case against the modem historians mainly by 
example, by proceeding to show how much we may learn from the 
revolutionary past by studying it seriously. 
Two essays in The Thinking Revolutionary take up the 
thoughts of individual revolutionary statesmen, from rather unusual 
perspectives. "Franklin, Spectator" shows us Benjamin Franklin 
through his Autobiography and "Jefferson's Pulse of Republican 
Transformation" shows us Thomas Jefferson through the Virginia 
laws he helped to revise in the late 1770s. 
Franklin reveals himself to be "as ardent a fisher for souls" as 
any preacher, although for a different purpose and by different 
means. He wished to improve others, and himself, but his concern 
was with this world and not the next, and with enjoying in modera-
tion the pleasures that it offered. Utility was his guide to self-im-
provement, whether the matter at hand was the practice of religion, 
the choice of studies, or the taking of a wife. Utility also informed 
Franklin that it was easier to win souls by pleasing others than by 
arguing with them; thus, Lerner observes, Franklin wrote his Auto-
biography to be entertaining as well as instructive. Franklin was "a 
master at ingratiating himself with his reader or auditor," Lerner 
says, to which I will add that Jefferson was his star pupil. 7 And yet 
Franklin keeps his distance from us and suggests, as I understand 
Lerner, that Americans do the same in their relations with one 
another. 
In his prodigious labor to revise Virginia's colonial laws, Jeffer-
son sought, as Lerner informs us, to lay the foundation for a society 
5. See Letter from Jefferson to the President (May 8, 1791), reprinted in 8 T. JEFFER-
SON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 193 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1904) [here-
inafter T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGs); Letter from Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and 
Character of John Adams. Esq., President of the United States (Oct. 14, 1800), reprinted in 25 
A. HAMILTON, THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 190 (H. Syrett ed. 1977). 
6. Schmitt & Webking, Revolutionaries, Antifederalists, and Federalists: Comments on 
Gordon Wood's Understanding of the American Founding, 9 PoL SCI. REVIEWER 195 (1979). 
Lerner footnotes but does not discuss this article. 
7. See Letter from Jefferson to T.J. Randolph (Nov. 24, 1808), reprinted in 12 T. JEF-
FERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 5, at 198-200. 
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that would be "self-governed by truly free men." Jefferson himself 
singled out four measures, those to abolish entails and primogeni-
ture, to disestablish religion, and to provide for general education at 
public expense,s and Lerner adds others, including proposals to al-
low voluntary expatriation (against the common-law rule of "per-
petual allegiance") and to abolish the death penalty for all crimes 
except murder and treason. 
Two of Lerner's essays are about early race relations. In "Reds 
and Whites," he says that the outcome of the confrontation between 
the two races was "perfectly predictable": the whites were bound to 
triumph. What then would be the fate of the Indians? Coexistence 
as separate nations was out of the question, for whites and Indians 
used the land in incompatible ways, whites for farming and Indians 
for hunting; besides, white America could not allow-no nation 
could-"populous self-governing enclaves of alien peoples" within 
it. Yet, as Lerner observes, republican principles required that the 
whites make a great effort "to include the Indians in the new polit-
ical society." Consequently, it became the policy of several admin-
istrations to induce the Indians to turn to farming and cottage 
industry. This policy ended in failure, dramatized by the removal 
of the Creeks and Cherokees-the tribes that most nearly met the 
conditions set for assimilation-beyond the Mississippi during the 
Jackson administration. 
Lerner discusses earlier government efforts to help the Indians 
make the transition to white ways of living: the appointment of 
agents, the licensing of white traders, the supplying of goods 
through government stores, instruction in agriculture and the do-
mestic arts, the control (at best, only partly effective) of white mi-
gration into Indian lands. He thinks that still more might have 
been done, but he doesn't say what and his story describes difficul-
ties that American statesmen before Jackson faced rather than op-
portunities that they missed. On one side in this drama were those 
proud Indians, resembling medieval aristocrats to Tocqueville's 
mind, who refused to become Lockean men, and, on the other side, 
those energetic Lockeans who were, to "the misfortune of the Indi-
ans," as Tocqueville relates, "the most civilized and, I will add, the 
most avid [people] on the globe."9 
"Tocqueville's American" takes as its text the famous chapter 
in Democracy in America on the three races that inhabit American 
8. See Jefferson, Autobiography, reprinted in I T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 5, 
at 73-74. 
9. A. TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DEMOCRATIE EN AMERIQUE, 2me partie, ch. x, at 346 
(Gallimard ed. 1951). Tocqueville says "avide," which in French as well as English can mean 
either "ardent" or "grasping." 
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soil. In Tocqueville's narrative of Indian pride, rejection of assimi-
lation, and ultimate doom, Lerner discerns the fate of aristocratic 
Europe; in that of black submission-the adoption of white men's 
opinions and consequently of bonds that impose a slavery over the 
mind-he discerns the possible fate of democracy itself. Democ-
racy is based on majority rule, which easily becomes majority tyr-
anny, so that, and here Lerner quotes from another part of 
Democracy in America, "One must in a sense renounce one's rights 
as a citizen and, so to say, one's status as a man when one wants to 
diverge from the path it [the majority] has marked out." Further, 
social equality lies in the soul of democracy and its spirit easily 
leads men, to take another quotation from Democracy in America, 
to accept "an immense, protective power which is alone responsible 
for securing their enjoyment and watching over their fate." 
In Lerner's sensitive rendering, Tocqueville's discussion of race 
relations in America carries a message to aristocrats in Europe and 
to democrats everywhere: accept the democratic future and seek to 
ameliorate its defects. 
Tocqueville makes his appearance again in Lerner's essay on 
"Commerce and Character," this time to temper the hopefulness of 
the founders of the American commercial republic. The founders 
were Europeans, especially Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and David 
Hume, who constructed in thought an order in which peoples 
would care more for safety and comfort than for honor and salva-
tion; where war had once divided them, trade would now unite 
them. American statesmen-John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, 
and Benjamin Rush, among others-are treated more as observers 
of this "market regime," as Lerner calls it, than as participants in its 
creation. Surely Hamilton, above all, deserves more credit than 
this. 
Tocqueville worried about the character formed by the Ameri-
can commercial republic. Equality, he observed, may lead to free-
dom, knowledge, and prosperity, but also to servitude, barbarism, 
and wretchedness. The alternative to a nation of free and equal in-
dividuals is one-Russia is Tocqueville's example-of timid and 
hard-working, yet still equal, animals. 
I come finally to Lerner's essay on The Supreme Court as Re-
publican Schoolmaster. The essay was originally published in 1967, 
and has frequently, and deservedly, been cited by scholars writing 
about the Court. Lerner maintains that "revolutionary thinkers" 
were concerned with "forming a certain kind of citizenry" in their 
republic and expected every part of the national government to do 
its part. The Supreme Court did so--assumed "the role of an edu-
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cator, molder, or guardian of ... manners, morals, and beliefs"-
first, through the grand-jury charge and, second, through judicial 
decisions. 
Traditionally used to instruct grand juries as to laws relevant 
to their deliberations, the grand-jury charge was employed by state 
judges to defend the American cause during the events that pre-
ceded and followed the break with Great Britain and then by 
Supreme Court Justices on circuit under the new Constitution to 
impart "political education" in a way that was "a cross between a 
political sermon and a speech from the throne." Lerner shows that 
these "political charges" reached well beyond their immediate audi-
ence, as they were often printed in newspapers, and also that their 
message not infrequently "ran counter to strong popular and parti-
san opinion." Indeed, they did. Supporters of France in her war 
with Great Britain could not have liked to hear Washington's Neu-
trality Proclamation defended-not merely explained-by Chief 
Justice John Jay, and to be told that they should not favor either 
side-that is, France-in the contest. The demise of this kind of 
schoolmastering was marked by Justice Samuel Chase's impeach-
ment in 1803 for having, among other things, lamented before a 
grand jury Congress's repeal of the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801 
and Maryland's granting of universal suffrage. Thereafter, notes 
Lerner, the political charge to the grand jury soon faded from view. 
According to Lerner, the next phase of the Supreme Court's 
role as Republican Schoolmaster began with the Chief Justiceship 
of John Marshall, when the Court undertook "to mold and edu-
cate" the people, "to inculcate civic virtue" in them through its de-
cisions. "Much of John Marshall's greatness lies in his success in, 
so to speak, putting the Supreme Court as a whole on circuit." And 
it has continued to be "on circuit" ever since. 
I need not say much about Lerner's discussion of the grand-
jury charge. Some Supreme Court Justices did talk politics from 
the circuit bench, as his copious quotations reveal, and most Ameri-
cans disapproved of this, not just because they did not agree with 
what they heard or read but also because they believed, in the words 
of Justice Chase's counsel at Chase's impeachment trial, "that polit-
ical subjects ought never to be mentioned in courts of justice." 
Lerner thinks, nonetheless, that the Supreme Court pursued 
the practice of "political sermons" in the guise of judicial opinions. 
One "mode" of political instruction was "merely replaced" by an-
other, albeit "less visible," one. He refers the reader to no decision 
of the Supreme Court or any other court, but infers that the Court 
acted in this from other evidence. That evidence strikes me as 
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weak. For example, he infers from the constitutional convention's 
rejection of a proposed Council of Revision, in which Supreme 
Court Justices would have been joined with the president in acting 
on congressional legislation, that "the purposes envisioned" by such 
an institution "are better served" by judicial interpretation. This is 
a surprising inference: both supporters and opponents of the Coun-
cil said that without this authority to pass upon the policy of legisla-
tion the Justices would, in their judicial capacity, be limited to 
passing upon its constitutionality.w 
To take another key example, Lerner infers from The Federal-
ist that the judiciary was expected to exercise "will (for we must call 
it that)," despite Hamilton's declaration in No. 78 (which Lerner 
quotes) that it was to possess "merely judgment" and that "will"-
the power to make laws-would belong to the legislative branch. 
Lerner reaches this surprising conclusion by speculating that Ham-
ilton didn't mean what he said in distinguishing will from judgment 
(he has Hamilton "smile" as he wrote), because "good sense" (cor-
roborated mainly by a remark of Madison in No. 37) tells us that 
the boundary between the two, like other definitional lines, cannot 
be marked precisely .11 Hamilton wrote this way, Lerner suggests, 
in order to deceive his readers (but not by much, as what he said, it 
turns out, "was essentially, though not simply, true"); as I under-
stand him, Lerner thinks Hamilton encouraged, or perhaps only al-
lowed, judges to avail themselves of this ambiguity in order to 
exercise what they would know to be will in their decisionmaking. 
I find such conjectures to be unsubstantiated and unconvinc-
ing. Hamilton does speak of judges exercising discretion-not 
will-in No. 78. They do so in determining the "meaning and oper-
ation" of contradictory laws, including an ordinary law and the 
Constitution, and also, it appears, in "mitigating and confining the 
10. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, 92-104, 138-40 (M. 
Farrand ed. 1937); 2 id. at 73-80; see also 2 id. at 298-302. 
II. Lerner subordinates to a footnote a reference to two remarks in No. 51 that he 
thinks support his disbelief in Hamilton's confinement of the courts to the exercise of judg-
ment. There Madison (or Hamilton) stated that each branch of government "should have a 
will of its own" and that their members should be supplied with the "personal motives" of 
"interest" and "ambition" to induce them to perform their constitutional duties. THE FED-
ERALIST No. 51, at 336, 337 (J. Madison or A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1941). It seems clear 
to me that "will" in this context refers to control over one's business, not the power to legis-
late, and that the ambitions and interests of judges were to be satisfied by the permanent 
possession of their offices, not by the opportunity to act beyond their authority. As Hamilton 
argued in No. 78, judges would be reluctant to be firm and independent in performing their 
duties-indeed, able lawyers would be discouraged from giving up their private practices-if 
judicial appointments were for a limited period. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 505, 511 (A. 
Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1941). 
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operation" of "unjust and partial" but not unconstitutional laws.12 
Yet if discretion is "indulged too far," as Blackstone, whom Hamil-
ton knew well, warned, "we destroy all laws" and "make every 
judge a legislator."l3 Hamilton's solution, similar to Blackstone's, 
was closely to limit the exercise of discretion. "To avoid an arbi-
trary discretion in the courts," he said in No. 78, "they should be 
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define 
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before 
them."l4 Marshall, it might be noted, spoke in a like manner: 
"When [courts] are said to exercise a discretion it is a mere legal 
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course pre-
scribed by law ... . "Is And so did Story: "Discretion ... is to be 
governed by the rules of law and equity, which are not to oppose, 
but each in its tum to be subservient to the other."l6 But neither 
Hamilton nor Marshall nor Story thought that discretion or, as we 
may call it, "equity," properly "bound down," will result in judges 
acting upon "their own pleasure." 11 
The Supreme Court has indeed acted as a schoolmaster to the 
American republic. Who can reflect on its major decisions and not 
appreciate their influence on public opinion? But, it seems to me, it 
can perform this task perfectly well within its assigned duties; there 
are lessons enough to be taught about the Constitution without its 
taking on extracurricular work. When the Justices have exceeded 
their constitutional role, they have often taught badly, as in Dred 
Scott v. Sanford. 
Lerner is not content to argue, as did Robert Faulkner in his 
fine book about Marshall's thought, that "[w]ith its authority to in-
terpret the Constitution established, the Supreme Court [under 
Marshall] could not help but influence profoundly the Americans' 
political life"; rather, he wants the Court to act on a "political plat-
form" in exercising "what we must call" will. He does not, like 
Faulkner, have Marshall seek "to inculcate ... a devotion to law," 
but has the Marshall Court act "to inculcate civic virtue."1s In so 
casting the work of the Court, Lerner, I think, seeks to correct what 
he perceives as a weakness in the framers' design. The "extended 
republic" of the framers, he remarks in one place, did not seem to 
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note II, at 506-07, 509. 
13. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61-62. 
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note II, at 510. 
15. Cited in R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 67 (1968). 
16. Cited in G. McDoWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME 
COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC POLICY 75 (1982). 
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note II, at 507. 
18. R. FAULKNER, supra note 15, at 221, 217. 
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fulfill "the preconditions of republican virtue." Indeed, "[w]hen 
sustaining republican virtue is the theme [of debate] the treatment 
[of those supporting adoption of the Constitution] is muted and sur-
prisingly incomplete." This bothers Lerner, but the justification, it 
seems to me, is quite plain: in a government intended to secure men 
in their natural rights, talk of inculcating virtue or molding man-
ners, morals, and beliefs grates upon the ears. So, too, does the 
word "regime" which Lerner uses repeatedly to describe America. 
In the tradition of political thought that term denied a separate 
sphere of private activity. 
It is not my purpose, however, to quarrel with Lerner over his 
desire to instill some virtue into the people and to borrow some of 
the attributes of a regime in doing it. What concerns me most is his 
attempt to draw the judiciary into what the framers considered to 
be the domain of the "political departments" of government, and to 
cite the most thoughtful framers in support of this project. That 
was not necessary to achieve Lerner's objective and will, I fear, mis-
educate his readers into believing that it is all right for judges to 
make policy in a good cause. 
My dispute with Lerner over the role of the Court should not 
obscure my admiration for this book. Lerner is well worth arguing 
with, and in the course of doing so I have furthered my own 
education. 
PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CON-
STITUTION. By Morton White.t New York, N.Y.: Oxford 
University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 273. $29.95. 
Eugene F. Miller 2 
Professor Morton White is the author or editor of more than a 
dozen books on philosophy and intellectual history, including The 
Philosophy of the American Revolution. In the present work, he 
seeks to carry forward his study of the American founding by ex-
tracting a philosophy from The Federalist. Professor White thinks 
of himself as a pioneer in this endeavor, because although various 
scholars have dealt with individual philosophical topics treated in 
The Federalist, "no other philosopher" has yet presented a synoptic 
view of its major philosophical ideas. 
I. Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. 
2. Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia. 
